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by ROBERT A. GREEN*
"If one's in the doghouse with the Chief, he gets the crud. He
gets the tax cases, and some of the Indian cases, which I like but
I've had a lot of them."'
Justice Blackmun's independent-mindedness often landed him
"in the doghouse with the Chief." As a result, he wrote many opin-
ions in tax cases. Fortunately, he took delight in being "in the dog-
house with the Chief,"2 as well as in writing tax opinions.3 By my
count, during his tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun
wrote majority opinions in 33 federal tax cases and concurring or dis-
senting opinions in an additional 26 federal tax cases.4 From time to
* Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. The author served as a law clerk
to Justice Blackmun during October Term 1984.
1. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Reading the Tea Leaves of a New Term, N.Y. TInES, Dec. 22,
1986, at B14 (quoting Justice Blackmun). Other Justices have made similar remarks.
Shortly after his retirement from the Court, Justice Powell remarked that "'[a] dog is a case
that you wish the Chief Justice had assigned to some other Justice.' A deadly dull case, 'a
tax case, for example."' Stuart Taylor, Jr., Powell on His Approacv Doing Justice Case by
Case, N.Y. Tams, Jul. 12, 1987, at 1 (quoting Justice Powell). Similarly, when a reporter
asked Justice Souter why he sings along with Chief Justice Rehnquist at the Court's annual
Christmas carol party, Justice Souter replied, "I have to. Otherwise I get all the tax cases."
Paul M. Barrett, Independent Justice: David Souter Emerges as Reflective Moderate on the
Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1993, at Al (quoting Justice Souter).
2. Richard A. Meserve, A Tribute to Justice Harry Blackmun, 97 DIcK. L. Rnv. 601,
602 (1993) ("Sometimes [during breakfast with his clerks] the Justice would announce with
wry bemusement, even glee, that he was 'in the doghouse with the Chief' over a particular
opinion").
3. See Donald Lay, The Cases of Blackmun, J, on the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit 1959-1970, 8 HAMLInm L. REv. 2, 3 (1985) ("[i]t was no secret on the
court, or among the bar, that Judge Blackmun enjoyed writing tax cases").
4. Classifying cases as "tax cases" is a line-drawing exercise that entails a certain
amount of discretion. I have tried to err on the conservative side. I have not counted a
number of cases that involved tax issues that are peripheral to the main issue in the case.
Justice Blackmun also wrote many of the landmark opinions in the area of state taxa-
tion. These opinions deal with challenges to state tax laws under the commerce clause and
the due process clause of the Constitution. For discussions of these cases, see Karen Nel-
son Moore, Justice Blackmun's Contributions on the Court The Commercial Speech and
State Taxation Examples, 8 HAmLn-m L. Rnv. 29, 49 (1985) (concluding that in the field of
state taxation, "Justice Blackmun has led the efforts to clarify and rationalize the Court's
[109]
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time, he urged the Court to hear even more tax cases. In one of his
dissents from a denial of certiorari, he took the Court to task for its
"natural reluctance to take on another complicated tax case that is
devoid of glamour and emotion," and argued that the Court should
review tax cases when the issue has "importance in the administration
of the income tax laws," even in the absence of a conflict among the
circuits.5
Many of Justice Blackmun's tax opinions are legendary among
tax lawyers and academics. It is no coincidence that law school
casebooks in federal income taxation typically include more cases
written by Justice Blackmun than by any other Supreme Court
Justice.6
For Justice Blackmun, tax law was not something apart from the
rest of the law. On the contrary, he viewed tax law as a microcosm of
the legal system. The tax system includes the substantive provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code ("the Code"), which prescribe the tax
treatment of various transactions. Cases involving these provisions
present the Justices with the full range of issues of statutory interpre-
tation with particular salience. To what extent should a Justice be
guided by purpose in interpreting a statute? In particular, in the tax
context, to what extent should a Justice be guided by his or her under-
standing of the underlying structure or logic of the tax system? How,
if at all, should a Justice's approach to statutory interpretation be af-
fected by the relative competence of the Supreme Court compared to
other law-making institutions? I will return to these questions later in
this article.
In addition to the substantive provisions of the Code, the tax sys-
tem also includes the Internal Revenue Service and other administra-
decisions"); see also Dan T. Coenen, Justice Blackmun, Federalism, and Separation of Pow-
ers, 97 DicK. L. REv. 541, 548 (1993) (noting that Justice Blackmun wrote several of his
most important contributions to the law of federalism in cases involving challenges to state
taxation under the dormant commerce clause).
5. Singleton v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 940 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). See also Robertson v. United States, 488 U.S. 899 (1988) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that the Court should grant certiorari in a
tax case for the reasons set forth in Mellon Bank N.A. v. United States); Mellon Bank,
N.A. v. United States, 475 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1986) (O'Connor, J., joined by Blackmun &
Powell, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that the Court should grant certi-
orari in a tax case even in the absence of a conflict among the circuits "because the Court
of Appeals' construction of the Code will have a significant impact on the financial vitality
of these [nonprofit] organizations and because I am unconvinced that this anomalous con-
struction is justified by the language and history of the relevant provisions of the Code").
6. See Stephen B. Cohen, Thurgood Marshall: Tax Lawyer, 80 GEo. L.J. 2011, 2011
(1992).
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tive agencies, with both civil and criminal functions, that have a
substantial effect on the lives of most Americans. The Supreme Court
has a role in protecting individuals by confining the power and discre-
tion of these agencies. Finally, the tax system includes a complicated
system of litigation that involves not only the federal courts of general
jurisdiction-the district courts, courts of appeals, and Supreme
Court-but also a specialized Article I court (the Tax Court) and spe-
cialized Article III courts (the Court of Claims and the Federal Cir-
cuit). The Supreme Court has a role in elaborating the rules that
govern the conduct of litigation in this judicial system. Thus, Justice
Blackmun's tax jurisprudence involves not only statutory interpreta-
tion in substantive tax cases, but also constitutional law, criminal law,
administrative procedure, and court procedure.
I. Justice Blackmun's Background in Taxation7
Justice Blackmun came to the Supreme Court with an expertise
in taxation that is exceptional among Supreme Court Justices.' He
majored in mathematics at Harvard College, receiving his A.B.
summa cum laude in 1929.9 He attended Harvard Law School from
1929-1932.10 At that time, Harvard Law School did not offer a single
course devoted exclusively to the subject of federal taxation." It was
not until eight years after Justice Blackmun's graduation that the first
law school casebook devoted to federal taxation, Erwin Griswold's
Cases on Federal Taxation, was published.' 2 Harvard Law School did
offer a tax course dealing primarily with state and local taxation,' 3 but
Justice Blackmun avoided taking it because he thought the subject
would be unimportant and dull.
After law school, Justice Blackmun clerked for a year and a half
for Judge John B. Sanborn on the United States Court of Appeals for
7. This section of the article is based in part on conversations with Justice Blackmun.
8. See William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 1990 ANN.
Surv. AMi. L. xi, xiii (noting that Justice Blackmun was the Court's authority on tax
matters).
9. See THE SurR Em COURT JusIcEs: ILLUsTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1993 486
(Clare Cushman ed., 1993) [hereinafter THE SuREm CouRT JusncEs].
10. See id.
11. See Interview with Erwin N. Griswold, 11 ABA SEC. OF TAX'N NEWSL., Spring
1992, at 57.
12. See id. at 56.
13. See id. at 57. In addition to this general tax course, Harvard Law School offered a
course in constitutional law that addressed the limitations on state and local taxation im-
posed by the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause. See id.
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the Eighth Circuit.'4 He then entered private practice with the Min-
neapolis firm of Dorsey, Colman, Barker, Scott, and Barber (now
Dorsey & Whitney). 5 At that time, federal taxation was just starting
to blossom as an area of practice. The Dorsey firm's lead tax partner,
Leland W. Scott, was a very able tax lawyer, but his health was poor,
and he was often unavailable to advise clients. The firm decided that
it would have to assign one of its associates to the tax department.
The associates, including Justice Blackmun, regarded this prospect as
a form of condemnation, and none volunteered. The firm chose Jus-
tice Blackmun. He would later regard this event as one of the best
things that ever happened to him.
Justice Blackmun remained with the Dorsey firm for sixteen
years, specializing in taxation and trusts and estates. 6 Much of his
work involved tax litigation, including litigation before the Supreme
Court. While Justice Blackmun was still at the Dorsey firm, Judge
Sanborn, who was a trustee of the St. Paul College of Law (now Wil-
liam Mitchell College of Law), suggested to Justice Blackmun that he
teach at the school. Justice Blackmun did so from 1935 to 1941.17 He
developed and taught the first tax course offered at the law school.
Justice Blackmun also taught at the University of Minnesota Law
School from 1945 to 1947.18
In 1950, Justice Blackmun left the Dorsey firm to become the first
resident counsel of the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota.1 9 At the
Mayo Clinic, he not only developed his well-known expertise in the
relationship between law and medicine, but he also continued to work
on federal tax issues.2" The Mayo Clinic is organized as a nonprofit
charitable foundation, and a substantial portion of the law of non-
profit organizations is tax related.2 ' Justice Blackmun remained at the
Mayo Clinic until 1959, when President Eisenhower nominated him to
14. See THE SuPmpm CouRT JusTicas, supra note 9, at 487.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See Biography, 8 HAmiNE L. Rv. 1, 1 (1985).
18. See id.
19. See THE Supnm~m CouRT JusncFs, supra note 9, at 487.
20. See Lay, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that Justice Blackmun's background as a lawyer
with the Mayo Clinic provided in-depth experience in the tax field).
21. Several of Justice Blackmun's majority tax opinions involved issues relating to tax-
exempt organizations. In particular, Portland Golf Club v. Commissioner, 497 U.S. 154
(1990), dealt with the method of calculating a tax-exempt organization's unrelated business
taxable income, and National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979),
interpreted the term "business league," a form of tax-exempt organization defined in sec-
tion 501(c)(6) of the Code.
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.2 2 Justice
Blackmun joined the Eighth Circuit on November 4, 1959, replacing
his mentor, Judge Sanborn. Once again, he found himself immersed
in tax issues.3 His former colleague, Chief Judge Donald Lay, has
estimated that more than 25 percent of Justice Blackmun's Eighth Cir-
cuit opinions were tax related.24
H. Justice Blackmun's Jurisprudence in Constitutional
Tax Cases
For many people, the words "tax case" conjure up the thought of
a mind-numbingly dense statutory provision buried deep in the re-
cesses of the Internal Revenue Code, which raises some hyper-techni-
cal issue that only an accountant could possibly understand or care
about. There is, however, much more to tax law. Before turning to
substantive tax issues, I will discuss Justice Blackmun's opinions in
two tax cases that raise constitutional issues, United States v. Carlton,
and G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States.26 In both of these cases,
Justice Blackmun rejected the view that there is something unique
about taxation, and that special constitutional rules should apply.27
Carlton involves the constitutionality of retroactive tax legislation, an
issue that has received considerable academic attention. Justice
Blackmun's insights in this case led him to a conclusion that is consis-
22. See Tim SuPRlmps COURT JusncEs, supra note 9, at 487.
23. See id.
24. See Lay, supra note 3, at 3; see also THE Surpi mE COURT JUsTcEs, supra note 9,
at 487 (noting that "[a] substantial percentage of Blackmun's opinions on the Eighth Cir-
cuit concerned taxation").
25. 512 U.S. 26 (1994).
26. 429 U.S. 338 (1977). Justice Blackmun also wrote the majority opinion in two
other tax cases involving constitutional issues. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868
(1991), involved the application of the Appointments Clause to the Tax Court judges. The
Appointments Clause provides that "the Congress may by law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of law, or
in the Heads or Departments." Section 7443A(b)(4) of the Code authorizes the Chief
Judge of the Tax Court to assign any Tax Court proceeding, regardless of complexity or
amount in controversy, to a special trial judge for hearing and preparation of proposed
findings and a written opinion. Justice Blackmun concluded that a special trial judge is an
"inferior Officer," and therefore must be appointed by the President, by a court of law, or
by a head of a department. Justice Blackmun then upheld section 7443A(b)(4) on the
ground that the Tax Court is a "Court[ ] of Law" within the meaning of the Appointments
Clause. In United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60 (1976), Justice Blackmun held that
the "exclusionary rule should not be extended to forbid the use in the civil proceeding of
one sovereign [the federal government] of evidence illegally seized by a criminal law en-
forcement agent of another sovereign [the state government]."
27. See Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30-31; G.M. Leasing, 420 U.S. at 358-59.
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tent with the rather nonintuitive conclusions of the academic writers.28
G.M. Leasing raises the issue whether there is a "tax enforcement"
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.29
This case illustrates the important role of the Supreme Court in con-
trolling the power and discretion of the Internal Revenue Service.
A. Retroactive Tax Legislation: United States v. Carlton
As originally enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (the "1986
Act"),3" section 2057 of the Code allowed an estate to claim an estate
tax deduction equal to one-half of the proceeds of any sale of em-
ployer securities by the executor of the estate to an employee stock
ownership plan ("ESOP").31 This deduction was available to any es-
tate that filed a timely estate tax return after October 22, 1986, the
date of enactment of the 1986 Act.32 To qualify for this deduction, an
employer securities sale had to occur before the deadline for filing the
estate tax return, including any extensions. 33
Jerry W. Carlton was the executor of the will of Willametta K.
Day, who died on September 29, 1985.14 To take advantage of the
new ESOP deduction, Carlton used estate funds to purchase 1.5 mil-
lion shares of MCI stock at a price of $11,206,000 on December 19,
1986.31 Two days later, Carlton sold the stock to the MCI ESOP for
$10,575,000. Therefore, the estate incurred a loss of $631,000 on this
transaction.36 On December 29, 1986, Carlton filed a timely estate tax
return, in which he claimed a deduction under section 2057 for one-
half of the proceeds of the sale of the stock to the MCI ESOP, or
28. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L.
REv. 509 (1986); Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income
Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 47 (1977).
29. See G.M. Leasing, 420 U.S. at 358-59.
30. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1172(a), 100 Stat. 2085 (adding
new Code § 2057).
31. See I.R.C. § 2057(b). Section 2057 was one of a series of congressional efforts to
promote ESOPs by providing tax incentives. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 133 (partial income tax
exclusion for interest paid to banks on ESOP loans), 1042 (allowing certain taxpayers to
defer capital gains taxes on sales of securities to ESOPs).
32. I.R.C. § 2057(c)(1).
33. See id.
34. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 28 (1994).
35. See id.
36. See id. Not only had the market price of the stock fallen during the two-day period
when the estate held the stock, but in addition, the estate sold the stock below the market
price on the day of the sale. Congress expected that executors and ESOPs would negotiate
such a below-market sales price, which would enable ESOPs to capture part of the benefit
of the estate tax deduction.
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$5,287,000.37 This deduction reduced the estate's tax liability by
$2,501,161.38
There is little doubt that Congress never intended section 2057 to
apply to such a transaction. Instead, it seems clear that Congress in-
tended section 2057 to apply only when an executor sells stock that
the decedent owned before death.3 9 The language of section 2057,
however, did not contain any such limitation. As a result, any estate
could do what the Day estate did and claim a huge deduction by en-
gaging in a transaction that almost completely lacks economic sub-
stance. Because of this, section 2057 would result in a revenue loss of
as much as $7 billion over a five-year period-over 20 times more
than Congress had anticipated when it enacted the provision in 1986.40
Congress acted quickly to close this loophole. On February 26,
1987, a bill was introduced to amend section 2057 to clarify that a sale
of employer securities by an executor would not qualify for the deduc-
tion unless "the decedent directly owned the securities immediately
before death."'" This amendment was labeled a "Congressional Clari-
fication of Estate Tax Deduction for Sales of Employer Securities,"
and its legislative history stated:
As drafted, the estate tax deduction was significantly broader
than what was originally contemplated by Congress in enacting
the provision. The committee believes it is necessary to conform
the statute to the original intent of Congress in order to prevent
a significant revenue loss under the [1986 Act].4 2
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See STAFF OF JoNrr Comm. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., 2D SEss., TAX REFORM
PROPOSALS: TAX TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS (ESOPs) 37
(Comm. Print 1985) (stating that Congress intended to create an "incentive for stockhold-
ers to sell their companies to their employees who helped them build the company rather
than liquidate, sell to outsiders or have the corporation redeem their shares on behalf of
existing stockholders").
40. See 133 CONG. REc. H4145, H4293 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1987) (statement of Mr.
Bentsen).
41. Id. In introducing the amendment, Senator Bentsen observed: "Congress did not
intend for estates to be able to claim the deduction by virtue of purchasing stock in the
market and simply reselling the stock to an ESOP ... and Congress certainly did not
anticipate a $7 billion revenue loss." Id. at H4294. Without the amendment, Senator Bent-
sen stated, "taxpayers could qualify for the deductions by engaging in essentially sham
transactions." Id.
42. H. R. REP. No. 100-391, pt. H, at 1045 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N., vol.
4, 2313-1, 2313-661.
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This bill became law on December 22, 1987.41 Congress made the
new requirement retroactive to the date of the 1986 Act.' 4 Therefore,
the amendment applied to Carlton's sale of stock in December 1986.
When the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS" or the "Service")
audited the tax return for the Day estate, it disallowed the $5,287,000
deduction under section 2057 on the ground that Day had not owned
the MCI stock immediately before her death.4' This disallowance re-
sulted in a deficiency of $2,501,161.46 In the district court, Carlton
conceded that the deficiency would be correct if the 1987 amendment
were applicable.47 He argued, however, that the retroactive applica-
tion of the 1987 amendment to his 1986 transaction violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.4" The district court ruled for
the government.49
A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed.5" The panel majority concluded the retroactive applica-
tion of the amendment was unconstitutionally harsh and oppressive
because Carlton had detrimentally relied on the pre-amendment ver-
sion of section 2057 when he engaged in the MCI stock transactions in
December 1986, without any notice that Congress would amend sec-
tion 2057.51
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed with the
Ninth Circuit that the "bait-and-switch" taxation in Carlton was harsh
and oppressive.52 In their view, Congress in 1986 had invited Carlton
to buy and sell the MCI stock in order to obtain the estate tax deduc-
tion.53 In reliance on this invitation, Carlton did so at a cost to the
estate of $600,000. 5 4 Congress then retroactively disallowed the de-
duction and failed to compensate the estate for the cost it had in-
curred.55 Justices Scalia and Thomas concluded that it was "harsh and
43. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10411, 101
Stat. 1330, 1330-432 (1987).
44. See id.
45. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 29 (1994).
46. See id at 25.
47. See id. at 26.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 512 U.S. 26
(1994).
51. See id.
52. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id at 40.
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oppressive" when legislation "without notice,.. . gives a different and
more oppressive legal effect to conduct undertaken before enactment
of the statute."56
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun began by review-
ing the standard for determining whether retroactive tax legislation
violates the Due Process Clause.5 7 In tax cases, the Court's traditional
standard has been whether "retroactive application is so harsh and
oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation."58 In modem
cases involving economic legislation arising outside of the tax context,
however, the Court has asked whether the retroactive legislation is
"arbitrary and irrational."5 9 The Court declared in 1984 that these
two standards are identical.60 In Carlton, Justice Blackmun reaffirmed
the identity of these due process standards. Constitutionality only re-
quires that the retroactive application of the statute be "supported by
a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means."'"
Applying this test, Justice Blackmun rejected the conclusion of
the Ninth Circuit, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas that the retroac-
tive application of a tax statute is harsh and oppressive when a tax-
payer has detrimentally relied on prior law, without notice that
Congress might change it.6' Justice Blackmun noted that "[t]ax legis-
lation is not a promise, and a taxpayer has no vested right in the Inter-
nal Revenue Code., 6
3
Indeed, the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit and the concurring Jus-
tices is circular on the issue of reasonable reliance. They implicitly
assumed that it is reasonable for a taxpayer to expect that the tax laws
will not change in the absence of specific notice to the contrary, and
they then concluded that the courts must protect this expectation. It is
reasonable, however, for taxpayers to have such an expectation only if
the courts do protect their expectation. If the Supreme Court were to
56. Id. at 39. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting United States v. Hernme,
476 U.S. 558,569 (1986)). In spite of finding the retroactive application of the 1987 amend-
ment "harsh and oppressive," Justice Scalia concluded that the retroactive application did
not violate the Due Process Clause because the Due Process Clause guarantees no sub-
stantive rights, only process. Id. at 40.
57. See id. at 30-31.
58. United States v. Herine, 476 U.S. 558, 568-69 (1986); Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S.
134, 147 (1938).
59. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
60. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717,733 (1984).
61. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 30-31 (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 467 U.S. at
733).
62. See id. at 39.
63. Id. at 33.
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decree, as it did in Carlton, that the tax law is subject to change retro-
actively without notice, then reliance on the contrary expectation
would cease to be reasonable. The question to be answered is
whether the Court should decree this, or whether it should perpetuate
taxpayer reliance on the expectation that the law will not change ret-
roactively by declaring such change unconstitutional. The answer to
this question requires an analysis of the consequences of making legal
change retroactive.
Justice Blackmun had the key insight that the reliance argument
proves too much, for even "[a]n entirely prospective change in the law
may disturb the relied-upon expectations of individuals, but such a
change would not be deemed therefore to be violative of due pro-
cess." 64 In common usage, a retroactive statute is one whose effective
date provision specifically applies the new statutory rule to events oc-
curring prior to the date of enactment. This type of retroactivity is
more precisely called "nominal retroactivity."65 The 1987 amendment
in Carlton was of this form. A prospective (or "nominally prospec-
tive") statute, in contrast, is one whose effective date provision makes
the new statutory rule applicable only to events occurring after the
date of enactment.66
To see how a prospective statute can disturb reliance interests,
consider a taxpayer who is deciding whether to invest in an asset. The
value of an investment asset is determined by the discounted present
value of the future stream of after-tax income that the taxpayer ex-
pects the asset to generate. Suppose the taxpayer determines that
under current tax law, this discounted present value exceeds the cost
of acquiring the asset. The taxpayer should then rationally invest in
the asset. Now, suppose that after the taxpayer makes this invest-
ment, the tax law is amended to increase the taxation of the income
generated by that asset. Suppose further that this amendment is pro-
spective, applying only to income generated after the date of enact-
ment. In spite of this prospectivity, the amendment will immediately
reduce the value of the asset because it will reduce the stream of after-
tax income that the asset is expected to generate. As a result, the
taxpayer who purchased the asset before the amendment was enacted,
in reliance on then-current law, will experience a dramatic loss of
wealth. If we are to protect this taxpayer's reliance interest in the law
that existed at the time he made the investment, then we must strike
64. Id. at 33-34.
65. See Graetz, supra note 28, at 49.
66. See id.
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down even this purely prospective amendment. Striking down laws on
this basis would enormously hinder Congress' efforts at meaningful
tax reforms.
The Ninth Circuit and the concurring Justices asked the wrong
question in Carlton. They took Carlton's decision to engage in the
stock transaction as a given, and asked whether it was fair for the new
law to apply retroactively to that prior decision. Thus, they used a
backward-looking approach. A forward-looking approach would ask
the following question: If the Court were to decree that the law is
subject to retroactive change without notice, what consequences
would this have on taxpayers' decisions in the future?
One obvious consequence is that investors would face greater risk
in the future. Investors are often able to protect themselves, however,
against the risk of change. For example, they can diversify their in-
vestments. A second, less obvious consequence is that such a decree
would affect investors' incentives in the future. If investors expect
that their investments will be protected from adverse changes in the
law, they will have no incentive to try to predict changes in govern-
ment policy, and they will undertake investments even when there is a
significant likelihood that those investments will be judged undesir-
able in light of future reforms. On the other hand, if investors expect
that their investments will be affected by adverse changes in the law,
they will have an incentive to try to predict changes in government
policy, and they will make investment decisions that are optimal in
light of all available information about future policy.67
This argument provides strong policy support for Justice Black-
mun's conclusion that it should not be considered unconstitutional
when legislation, to use Justice Scalia's words, "without notice,...
gives a different and more oppressive legal effect to conduct under-
taken before enactment of the statute."6 The transaction in Carlton
did not really amount to an investment because Carlton sold the MCI
stock immediately after he purchased it. Nevertheless, a similar anal-
ysis applies. It should have been reasonably predictable in December
1986, even without specific notice, that Congress might change the
67. This analysis is not limited to the tax context. It is desirable for investors to try to
predict legal change in general, and to take into account rational expectations about such
change when they make investment decisions. Indeed, this analysis is not limited to the
legal context. From the investor's perspective, the risk of legal change is not essentially
different from other risks, such as the risk that technology, or consumer tastes, or even the
weather will change. It is desirable for investors to take all such risks into account.
68. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting United
States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 569 (1986)).
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1986 law. This predictability was enhanced by several factors that Jus-
tice Blackmun emphasized: (1) the retroactive amendment corrected
an apparent mistake, (2) this mistake would have caused a significant
and unanticipated revenue loss, (3) the taxpayer was able to take ad-
vantage of the mistake by engaging in a "purely tax-motivated" trans-
action (one with almost no economic substance), and (4) the
legislative change in fact occurred within a short period of time after
the transaction took place. 9
If taxpayers were protected from retroactive changes in these cir-
cumstances, they would have no incentive to predict such changes and
to modify their conduct accordingly. This is particularly undesirable
in the tax context, where taxpayers can move huge amounts of money
very quickly to take advantage of temporarily available loopholes.
The same logic applies even in situations where legal reform is less
predictable. It is socially desirable for taxpayers to have an incentive
to make decisions that are based on a rational assessment of the possi-
bility of legal reform.
B. Confining the Power and Discretion of the Internal Revenue
Service: G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States
G.M. Leasing Corp. was managed and controlled by George I.
Norman, Jr., who failed to file appropriate tax returns and subse-
quently became a fugitive.70 Because of these circumstances, the Ser-
vice made a jeopardy assessment against Norman.7' In turn, this gave
the United States a lien upon all of Norman's property.72 As a result,
the Service was authorized to levy upon Norman's property in order
to collect the taxes he owed.73 Because G.M. Leasing was found to be
Norman's alter ego, the Service was also authorized to levy upon
G.M. Leasing's assets in order to satisfy Norman's income tax liability.
Section 6331(b) of the Code defines "levy" to include "the power of
distraint and seizure by any means."'74
69. Id. at 32.
70. G.M. Leasing v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 342 (1977).
71. See id. Section 6861(a) of the Code provides in pertinent part that "[i]f the Secre-
tary believes that the assessment or collection of a deficiency... will be jeopardized by
delay, he shall... immediately assess such deficiency..., and notice and demand shall be
made by the Secretary for the payment thereof." I.R.C. § 6861(a).
72. See id. at 350. Section 6321(a) of the Code provides in pertinent part that "[i]f any
person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the
amount... shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to
property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person." I.R.C. § 6321(a).
73. See G.M. Leasing, 429 U.S. at 343.
74. I.R.C. § 6331(b).
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Two days after the Service made this jeopardy assessment, reve-
nue officers, "acting without a warrant," broke into a cottage owned
by G.M. Leasing.75 Once inside, they were unable to determine
whether the cottage was a residence or an office. 76 They decided not
to seize any property until they could clarify this situation. 77 That
night, however, they observed that the lights were on in the cottage
and that somebody was removing boxes. 78 Additionally, they received
information that the cottage was an office and not a residence.79
Therefore, sometime during the next two days, the agents again broke
into the cottage without a warrant and seized its remaining contents,
including furnishings, books, and records.8" G.M. Leasing subse-
quently brought a suit against the government alleging that the levy
violated the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.8'
In the Supreme Court, the government claimed the existence of
"a broad exception to the Fourth Amendment that allows warrantless
intrusions into privacy" in furtherance of tax law enforcement.8 2 In
support of this contention, the government noted "that the First Con-
gress, which proposed the adoption of the Bill of Rights, also provided
that certain taxes could be 'levied by distress and sale of goods of the
person or persons refusing or neglecting to pay."'8 3 The government
also argued that the history of the common law in England and the
laws in several states prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights sup-
port a "tax enforcement" exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.'
Justice Blackmun reviewed these historical materials and con-
cluded that they did not include "anything approaching the clear evi-
dence that would be required to create so great an exception to the
Fourth Amendment's protection against warrantless intrusions into
75. G.M. Leasing, 429 U.S. at 344-45.




80. See id. at 345-46. In addition to levying on the premises and contents of G.M.
Leasing's office, revenue officers also levied on automobiles registered in G.M. Leasing's
name that were parked on public streets, parking lots, and other open places. See id. at
344. The Court held that the warrantless seizure of these automobiles did not violate the
Fourth Amendment, because the seizure did not involve any invasion of personal privacy.
See iL at 351-52.
81. See id at 346.
82. Id. at 354.
83. 1d (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 23, 1 Stat. 199, 204).
84. See id at 355.
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privacy."" To the contrary, he found that the historical evidence
pointed in the opposite direction: "[O]ne of the primary evils intended
to be eliminated by the Fourth Amendment was the massive intrusion
on privacy undertaken in the collection of taxes pursuant to general
warrants and writs of assistance. 8 6
The government also argued that the congressional enactment of
section 6331(b), authorizing "distraint and seizure by any means," jus-
tifies warrantless searches for tax enforcement purposes.' Justice
Blackmun construed the statute, however, as being "silent on the sub-
ject of intrusions into privacy"; it merely "authorizes all forms of
seizure.""8 Not only did Justice Blackmun find this the most natural
reading of the statute, but he also noted that a construction of the
statute as authorizing intrusions into privacy by any means would raise
serious constitutional questions.8 9 As the facts of G.M. Leasing illus-
trate, searches in connection with tax levies involve considerable dis-
cretion on the part of the seizing officers as well as questions of
disputed fact, such as whether the cottage was an office or a residence.
Thus, judicial oversight is necessary.
Justice Blackmun also rejected the argument that a "tax enforce-
ment" exception to the warrant requirement could be justified by spe-
cial circumstances, such as the need for rapid action or the fact that
the search involved a business that was pervasively regulated and sub-
ject to government licensing.90 Unlike these established exceptions to
the warrant requirement, a "tax enforcement" exception would be ex-
tremely broad, covering all defaults on all taxes. Justice Blackmun
concluded that "the mere interest in the collection of taxes is insuffi-
cient to justify a statute declaring per se exempt from the warrant re-
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 356.
88. Id. at 358.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 357-58. Justice Blackmun distinguished United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S.
311, 316-17 (1972), and Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76 (1970).
See G.M. Leasing, 429 U.S. at 353-54. In Biswell, the Court upheld a warrantless search of
a locked storeroom during business hours, pursuant to the inspection procedure authorized
by the Gun Control Act of 1968, noting that when a gun dealer chooses to engage in the
pervasively regulated business of selling guns and to accept a federal license, he does so
with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to
effective inspection. See Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316. Similarly, in Colonnade Catering Corp.,
the Court concluded that Congress has broad authority to fashion standards of reasonable-
ness for searches and seizures to regulate the liquor industry. See Colonnade Catering
Corp., 397 U.S. at 86-87.
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quirement every intrusion into privacy made in furtherance of any tax
seizure." 9
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in G.M. Leasing, the
Service now prohibits agents from entering a taxpayer's premises to
seize property for tax collection purposes unless they first obtain a
court order.92 This procedure enables the district court to verify the
existence of probable cause and to control the revenue officers' discre-
tion by limiting the scope of the search.93
II. Justice Blackmun's Jurisprudence in Cases Involving
Substantive Tax Issues
The Supreme Court's role in the development of the substantive
law of taxation involves statutory interpretation. Analyses of the con-
tributions of Supreme Court Justices seldom devote much attention to
their approaches to statutory interpretation. Constitutional law is
much more glamorous.94 But this selectivity results in a highly dis-
torted picture of what the Justices actually do. Only a minority of the
cases they decide involve constitutional issues; a far greater number
involve statutory interpretation.95
Justice Blackmun's opinions in substantive tax cases provide an
excellent window into his approach to statutory interpretation. These
opinions raise several over-arching issues with particular salience.
One is how the relative competency of the Supreme Court compared
91. Carlton, 429 U.S. at 358.
92. See generally MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 14.0812][fj, at 14-58 to 14-59 (2d ed. 1991).
93. See id. at 14-58 & n.31, 14-59 & nn.32-33.
94. See Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATiON: FEDERAL
CouRTS AND Tim LAW 95, 98-99 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). Professor Glendon notes:
In the heyday of the Warren and Burger Courts, scholarship in statutory fields
like tax, securities, and labor law gradually fell out of fashion as constitutional law
became the glamour subject in the legal academy. The legislative process itself
came in for disdain as dramatic civil rights decisions promoted the illusion that
social change could be effected through litigation.
Id.
95. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATrER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL CouRs AND THE LAW, 13-14 (Amy Gutmann 3 ed., 1997).
Justice Scalia notes:
Even in the Supreme Court, I would estimate that well less than a fifth of the
issues we confront are constitutional issues-and probably less than a twentieth if
you exclude criminal-law cases. By far the greatest part of what I and all federal
judges do is to interpret the meaning of federal statutes and federal agency
regulations.
Id. (parenthesis omitted).
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to other law-making institutions should affect the Justices' approach
to statutory interpretation. Another is the extent to which the Justices
should rely on their sense of the underlying structure or logic of a
statutory scheme in deciding a case.
A threshold problem in examining Justice Blackmun's substan-
tive tax opinions is their sheer number. Compounding this problem is
the fact that the Justices seldom have an opportunity to engage in a
sustained development of any one aspect of statutory law. They are
limited by the cases that come before the Court and the cases that are
assigned to them for an opinion. 96 I have chosen to focus on several
cases that illuminate the over-arching issues referred to above. First, I
consider a series of opinions that Justice Blackmun wrote that actually
deal with a single aspect of tax law: the treatment of capital expendi-
tures. Although this issue might seem to epitomize the hyper-techni-
cality of the tax law, it actually goes to the heart of the nature of an
income tax. Then, I conclude by discussing one of Justice Blackmun's
most famous tax opinions, Commissioner v. Tufts,97 which sharply
raises the issue of how the Justices should deal with conflicts between
"tax logic" and the language of the Code.
A. The Treatment of Capital Expenditures: Lincoln Savings and
Loan, INDOPCO, Idaho Power, and Newark Morning Ledger
Section 162(a) of the Code allows a deduction for "all the ordi-
nary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year
in carrying on any trade or business."98 "Ordinary" and "necessary"
are commonplace words, but what do they mean in this context? In
Welch v. Helvering,99 Justice Cardozo interpreted the word "neces-
sary" to impose only the minimal requirement that the expenses be
"appropriate and helpful" for the development of the taxpayer's busi-
ness.100 His opinion suggests that the word "ordinary" is meant to
distinguish between expenses that are currently deductible and those
96. See Moore, supra note 4, at 30-31 (discussing factors largely beyond the control of
a Justice that affect his ability to influence the development of legal doctrine).
97. 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
98. I.R.C. § 162(a).
99. 290 U.S. 111 (1933). The issue in Welch was whether certain payments made by
the taxpayer to enhance his business reputation were deductible from income as ordinary
and necessary expenses, or instead were in the nature of capital expenditures. See id. at
112.
100. Id. at 113; see Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966) (noting that the
Court's decisions "have consistently construed the term 'necessary' as imposing only the
minimal requirement that the expense be 'appropriate and helpful' for 'the development of
the [taxpayer's] business"') (quoting Welch, 290 U.S at 113).
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that are in the nature of capital expenditures.1"' But Justice Cardozo
was unable to provide any guidance for making this distinction, be-
yond the following unhelpful comment:
Here, indeed, as so often in other branches of the law, the deci-
sive distinctions are those of degree and not of kind. One strug-
gles in vain for any verbal formula that will supply a ready
touchstone. The standard set up by the statute is not a rule of
law; it is rather a way of life. Life in all its fullness must supply
the answer to the riddle.102
The distinction between ordinary expenses and capital expendi-
tures is reiterated in section 263(a)(1) of the Code, which provides
that no deduction shall be allowed for an "amount paid out for new
buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to in-
crease the value of any property or estate.' 0 3 Justice Blackmun ex-
plained the significance of the distinction between ordinary expenses
and capital expenditures in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner:'°
The primary effect of characterizing a payment as either a busi-
ness expense or a capital expenditure concerns the timing of the
taxpayer's cost recovery: While business expenses are currently
deductible, a capital expenditure usually is amortized and depre-
ciated over the life of the relevant asset, or, where no specific
asset or useful life can be ascertained, is deducted upon dissolu-
tion of the enterprise.0 5
The timing of a cost recovery might seem like a technicality, but it
is fundamental to the nature of an income tax. The most widely ac-
cepted economic definition of income, generally referred to as the
Haig-Simons definition, defines personal income as "the algebraic
sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2)
the change in the value of the store of property rights between the
beginning and end of the period in question.' 0 6 More succinctly, per-
sonal income is the sum of consumption and saving, where saving re-
fers to the increase in the taxpayer's net worth during the taxable
period.
101. In Tellier, Justice Stewart cited Welch for the proposition that "[tihe principal func-
tion of the term 'ordinary' in § 162(a) is to clarify the distinction, often difficult, between
those expenses that are currently deductible and those that are in the nature of capital
expenditures which, if deductible at all, must be amortized over the useful life of the asset."
Tellier, 383 U.S. at 689-90 (citing Welch, 290 U.S. at 113-16).
102. Welch, 290 U.S. at 114-15.
103. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1).
104. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
105. Id. at 83-84.
106. HENRY C. SimONS, PERSONAL INcoME TAXATION 50 (1938).
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To illustrate this definition, suppose that a taxpayer purchases a
productive asset, such as a piece of business equipment, for $10,000.
This purchase does not involve consumption (using up goods and serv-
ices to obtain personal satisfaction), nor does it result in a change in
the taxpayer's net worth. Before the purchase, the taxpayer owned
$10,000 in cash. After the purchase, he owns equipment worth
$10,000. The tax law does not treat the increase in the taxpayer's net
worth from the acquisition of the equipment as income. Therefore, to
obtain the correct result under the Haig-Simons definition, the tax-
payer also should not be allowed to deduct the $10,000 cost of the
equipment in the year of purchase.
Now suppose that the equipment has a limited useful life, perhaps
because of wear or obsolescence. Then its value presumably will de-
cline each year, resulting in a decrease in the taxpayer's net worth
each year. Of course, the taxpayer's overall net worth might not de-
crease: The decrease in the value of the equipment might be offset by
revenues generated by the use of the equipment in the business. The
tax law, however, treats such revenues as income. Therefore, to ob-
tain the correct result under the Haig-Simons definition, the taxpayer
must be allowed to deduct the decline in value of the equipment
against these revenues (or against other income recognized by the tax
law).
In other words, under the Haig-Simons definition of income, the
taxpayer may not deduct the cost of the equipment as an ordinary and
necessary business expense in the year of the purchase, but rather
must capitalize the expenditure and deduct it over the useful life of
the equipment in the form of depreciation deductions. A common
way of explaining this, without explicitly referring to the Haig-Simons
definition, is in terms of a matching principle: "the Code endeavors to
match expenses with the revenues of the taxable period to which they
are properly attributable, thereby resulting in a more accurate calcula-
tion of net income for tax purposes."107
Suppose Congress were to repeal the requirement of capitaliza-
tion, thus allowing taxpayers to always deduct, or "expense," the cost
of assets in the year of acquisition. The resulting tax would not be an
income tax at all, but what is known as a "cash flow" tax. 08 The im-
107. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84.
108. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., How Much Capital Income Taxed Under an Income Tax is
Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 TAx L. REv. 1, 1 (1996). Professor Warren states:
Like an income tax, a cash flow tax would include receipts from a variety of
sources, including receipts from capital investment. The key distinction between
the two taxes is that capital costs are currently deducted (or "expensed") under
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mediate expensing of the full cost of acquisition would produce a large
tax savings in the year of acquisition, compared to the savings that
would be available under a Haig-Simons income tax. Recall that
Haig-Simons depreciation allows the cost of acquisition to be de-
ducted only gradually over the useful life of the asset as the asset
value declines. The immediate tax savings from expensing can dra-
matically reduce the burden of the tax on capital income. Indeed,
under certain plausible assumptions,10 9 the tax savings from expensing
completely eliminates the burden of the tax on capital income. In ef-
fect, capital income is exempt from the tax."10 Thus, repeal of the
capitalization requirement would radically change the fundamental
nature of the income tax.
In practice, it is not feasible to follow the Haig-Simons prescrip-
tion for depreciation exactly, because doing so would require the tax-
payer to determine the change in the fair market value of his assets
each year. It is usually very difficult to determine fair market value
without an actual sale. Therefore, the tax law assumes that assets de-
preciate in accordance with more-or-less arbitrary formulas. Indeed,
in some cases, the tax law simply assumes that an asset will lose all of
its value within the year of acquisition. Immediate expensing is then
allowed, even if, in reality, the asset retains value beyond the year. In
other cases, the tax law simply assumes that an asset will retain its
value indefinitely. No depreciation is then allowed. Any discrepancy
between these assumptions and actual changes in asset value are
taken into account upon the eventual sale or other disposition of the
asset, when gain or loss is calculated. These assumptions require line
drawing, and the proper location of these lines is often very unclear.
Justice Blackmun wrote his first opinion dealing with the treat-
ment of capital expenditures during his first Term on the Court. In
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings and Loan Association,"' he held
that an "additional premium" that a savings and loan association paid
to the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) was
the cash flow tax, whereas they are capitalized and later deducted (as deprecia-
tion or basis) under the income tax.
Id.
109. The key assumption is that the tax savings from expensing can be invested at the
same rate of return as the original investment. See id. at 1-2.
110. See id. This proposition has been known by tax policy analysts for over fifty years.
For an early statement, see E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment In-
centives, in INCOME, EMPLoYm:ENT AND PUBLIc PoLicY: EssAYs iN HONOR OF ALViN H.
HANSEN 300, 301 (1948).
111. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
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in the nature of a capital expenditure.112 This additional premium in-
creased the savings and loan association's interest in a "Secondary Re-
serve" maintained by the FSLIC. The savings and loan association
reported its interest in the FSLIC's Secondary Reserve as an asset on
its balance sheet. Justice Blackmun stated that "[w]hat is important
and controlling is that the [additional premium] serves to create or
enhance for Lincoln what is essentially a separate and distinct addi-
tional asset and that, as an inevitable consequence, the payment is
capital in nature and not an expense. 11 3 This is consistent with the
Haig-Simons definition of income, for if the payment creates or en-
hances an asset that retains value (i.e., produces benefits) beyond the
taxable year, the taxpayer has not suffered a loss in net worth equal to
the amount of the payment. Therefore, an immediate deduction of
the amount of the payment is not appropriate.
However, this formulation led to confusion in the lower courts.
Some courts interpreted Justice Blackmun's opinion to mean that only
expenditures that create or enhance separate and distinct assets are
required to be capitalized." 4 Justice Blackmun had the opportunity to
correct this misconception in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner."5
The taxpayer in INDOPCO incurred expenses for investment banking
fees, legal fees, and other acquisition-related costs in the course of a
friendly takeover, and it deducted these as ordinary and necessary
business expenses." 6 Justice Blackmun held that these expenditures
had to be capitalized, even though they did not create or enhance a
separate and distinct asset." 7 Justice Blackmun rejected the argument
that this holding is inconsistent with his opinion in Lincoln Savings
and Loan stating, "We had no occasion in Lincoln Savings to consider
the tax treatment of expenditures that, unlike the additional premi-
ums at issue there, did not create or enhance a specific asset, and thus
112. Id. at 354.
113. Id.
114. See e.g., NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 293-94 (4th Cir. 1982) (bank
expenditures for expansion-related planning reports, feasibility studies, and regulatory ap-
plications did not "create or enhance separate and identifiable assets," and therefore were
ordinary and necessary expenses under § 162(a)); Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner,
475 F.2d 775, 782 (2d Cir. 1973) (suggesting that Lincoln Savings and Loan "brought about
a radical shift in emphasis," making capitalization dependent on whether the expenditure
creates or enhances "a separate and distinct additional asset") (quoting Lincoln Savings
and Loan, 403 U.S. at 354).
115. 503 U.S. 79 (1991).
116. See id. at 82.
117. See id. at 90.
Fall 1998] JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S FEDERAL TAX JURISPRUDENCE 129
the case cannot be read to preclude capitalization in other
circumstances.' '1 18
What, then, is the test for distinguishing ordinary expenses from
capital expenditures? Justice Blackmun adopted a facts and circum-
stances test. Quoting Justice Cardozo's opinion in Welch v. Helvering,
he noted that "the 'decisive distinctions' between current expenses
and capital expenditures 'are those of degree and not of kind,"' that
"each case 'turns on its special facts,"' and that "the cases sometimes
appear difficult to harmonize." '119 Justice Blackmun emphasized,
however, that one factor, while not absolutely controlling, is neverthe-
less of paramount importance: whether the expenditure produces ben-
efits beyond the year in which it was incurred. 2 ° When this is the
case, capitalization of the expenditure is the norm, and expensing is
the exception.121 This expanded view of capital expenditures is also
consistent with the Haig-Simons definition of income. There is noth-
ing magical about the existence of a "separate and distinct asset." The
key is that the expenditure creates value (an addition to the taxpayer's
net worth) that lasts beyond the taxable year. It is always possible to
invent a name for this value, such as "share in the FSLIC's Secondary
Reserve," and then call it an "asset."
Justice Blackmun relied on an economic concept of income in de-
ciding INDOPCO.22 He supported his conclusion with a number of
other arguments as well. In particular, he relied on the language of
section 263(a)(1), which refers to "permanent improvements or bet-
terments."'" He concluded that this language "envisions an inquiry
into the duration and extent of the benefits realized by the tax-
payer."' 24 He also relied on the language and structure of the Code to
support his general conclusion that "deductions are exceptions to the
118. Id. at 87.
119. Id. at 86 (quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114, 116 (1933), and Deputy v.
Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 496 (1940)).
120. See id. at 87. Justice Blackmun noted that the "mere presence of an incidental
future benefit-'some future aspect' may not warrant capitalization." Id. (emphasis in
original) (quoting Lincoln Savings and Loan, 403 U.S. at 354). However, "a taxpayer's
realization of benefits beyond the year in which the expenditure is incurred is undeniably
important in determining whether the appropriate tax treatment is immediate deduction or
capitalization." Id.
121. See id. at 84.
122. See id. Justice Blackmun explained the purpose of capitalization by stating that
"the Code endeavors to match expenses with the revenues of the taxable period to which
they are properly attributable, thereby resulting in a more accurate calculation of net in-
come for tax purposes." Id.
123. Id. at 88.
124. Id.
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norm of capitalization."' In addition, he discussed lower-court
precedents and scholarly commentary dealing with the issue, and con-
cluded that "[c]ourts long have recognized that expenses such as
these, 'incurred for the purpose of changing the corporate structure
for the benefit of future operations are not ordinary and necessary
business expenses.'121
In addition, Justice Blackmun considered the practical implica-
tions of rejecting a "separate and distinct asset" requirement for capi-
talization.1 27  The taxpayer in INDOPCO argued that this
requirement provided a "principled basis" upon which to differentiate
ordinary expenses from capital expenditures, and that abandoning it
would create indeterminacy and uncertainty.121 Justice Blackmun re-
sponded by stating that little would be lost by abandoning the "sepa-
rate and distinct asset" test: "grounding tax status on the existence of
an asset would be unlikely to produce the bright-line rule that peti-
tioner desires, given that the notion of an 'asset' is itself flexible and
amorphous.' 2 9
Justice Blackmun's opinion in INDOPCO, like his opinions in
other cases, exemplifies a practical reasoning approach to statutory
interpretation. The philosophical basis for this approach can be
traced back to Aristotle's theory of practical reasoning, which pro-
poses that one can determine what is right in specific cases, even with-
out a universal theory of what is right. 3 ° This approach does not rely
exclusively on any single touchstone for interpretation. Rather, it re-
lies on multiple arguments that draw on a broad range of evidence
and considerations: the statutory text, legislative history, legislative
purpose, post-enactment developments (including judicial and admin-
istrative precedents), and the practical consequences of alternative in-
terpretations. A useful metaphor for this approach is that of the
contrast between the chain and the cable:
A chain is no stronger than its weakest link, because if any of
the singly connected links should break, so too will the chain. In
contrast, a cable's strength relies not on that of individual
threads, but upon their cumulative strength as they are woven
125. Id. at 84.
126. Id. at 89 (quoting General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712, 715
(8th Cir. 1964), cert denied, 379 U.S. 382 (1964)).
127. Id. at 87 n.6.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See ARISTOTLE, NicoMAcrEAN ETmcs bk. VI, chs. 5-11 (H. Rackhlam trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1962); see generally William Eskridge & Philip Frickey, Statu-
tory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STA. L. REv. 321, 323-24 (1990).
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together. Legal arguments are often constructed as chains, but
they tend to be more successful when they are cable-like.'13
The practical reasoning approach tends to focus on the concrete,
to avoid broad opinions, to acknowledge indeterminancy, and to ad-
dress explicitly any conflicting evidence and policies. 132
This approach continues to be apparent in Justice Blackmun's
next case involving the treatment of capital expenditures, Commis-
sioner v. Idaho Power Co.'33 Idaho Power Co. owned transportation
equipment used in constructing its own power facilities. 34 The com-
pany reported the allowable depreciation for its transportation equip-
ment as an ordinary and necessary business expense. 35 Justice
Blackmun's opinion in Idaho Power held that a portion of this equip-
ment depreciation must be allocated to the taxpayer's construction of
its power facilities, and that this portion must be treated as a capital
expenditure.13 6
Once again, Justice Blackmun's conclusion is consistent with the
Haig-Simons definition of income. Depreciation deductions normally
would be allowable with respect to the transportation equipment, be-
cause one would presume that the equipment declines in value as it is
used, and that this decline in value is not matched by untaxed appreci-
ation in value of other assets. In Idaho Power, however, the taxpayer
used the transportation equipment to construct other capital assets.137
The decline in value of the transportation equipment in the course of
this usage presumably was matched by an increase in the value of the
power facilities. The tax law does not treat this increase in value of
the power facilities as income. Therefore, if the tax law allowed Idaho
Power to deduct the depreciation on the transportation equipment
currently, the taxpayer would be reporting a net loss when none had
occurred. One can achieve the correct net result by denying the tax-
payer a current deduction for the amount of depreciation on the trans-
portation equipment to the extent that it is allocable to the
construction, and by requiring the taxpayer to capitalize this amount.
As in INDOPCO, Justice Blackmun relied on an economic con-
cept of income in deciding Idaho Power.3 s He also relied on a policy
131. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 130, at 351.
132. See id. at 371.
133. 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
134. See id. at 4.
135. See id. at 5.
136. See id. at 19.
137. See id. at 5.
138. See id. at 10-11, 14, 16.
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argument based on "tax parity": capitalization of construction-related
depreciation is necessary if taxpayers who do their own construction
work are to be treated comparably to taxpayers who hire independent
contractors to do their construction work.3 9 Justice Blackmun also
reasoned by analogy, noting that "[c]onstruction-related depreciation
is not unlike expenditures for wages for construction workers," and
that "when wages are paid in connection with the construction or ac-
quisition of a capital asset, they must be capitalized and are then enti-
tled to be amortized over the life of the capital asset."140
Finally, Justice Blackmun supported his decision by noting that
two regulatory agencies required Idaho Power to use accounting pro-
cedures that capitalized construction-related depreciation. 4 ' Justice
Blackmun considered this evidence relevant, although not
controlling. 42
As in INDOPCO, Justice Blackmun also focused on the text of
the statute, and responded explicitly to the taxpayer's arguments. 43
Section 263(a)(1) states that no deduction shall be allowed for "any
amount paid out for permanent improvements or betterments made to
increase the value of any property or estate."" The taxpayer argued
that depreciation of construction equipment represents merely a de-
crease in value and is not an amount "paid out" within the meaning of
this language. 145 Justice Blackmun concluded, however, that this lan-
guage could be construed to apply to depreciation as well as to a di-
rect payment of cash because "[i]n acquiring the transportation
equipment, taxpayer 'paid out' the equipment's purchase price; depre-
ciation is simply the means of allocating that payment over the various
accounting periods affected.' 1 46 Thus, each depreciation deduction
reflects a portion of the amount "paid out" to acquire the transporta-
tion equipment.
Justice Blackmun's last case involving the capitalization require-
ment, Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States,47 involved the
139. Id. at 14.
140. Id. at 13.
141. See id. at 14-15
142. See id. Justice Blackmun subsequently wrote Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 439 U.S. 522 (1979), the leading case dealing with the relationship between financial
or regulatory accounting and tax accounting.
143. See id. at 16.
144. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (emphasis added).
145. See Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 16.
146. Id. at 17.
147. 507 U.S. 546 (1993).
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tax treatment of acquired intangible assets.148 The taxpayer, Newark
Morning Ledger, was the successor to The Herald Company.1 9 In
1976, Herald acquired Booth Newspapers, Inc., which published eight
Michigan newspapers with about 460,000 subscribers.150 After the ac-
quisition, Herald continued to publish the eight newspapers under
their prior names.' 5' For federal income tax purposes, Herald allo-
cated the acquisition price of $328 million among the various assets of
Booth Newspapers. 52 Specifically, Herald allocated $234 million to
various financial and tangible assets and $68 million to an intangible
asset called "paid subscribers." 53 This latter asset consisted of the
460,000 identified subscribers to the eight Booth newspapers. 54
Although these subscribers could terminate their subscriptions at any
time, Herald expected most of them to continue to subscribe after the
change in ownership. 55 The "paid subscribers" asset reflected the
value of this future income expectancy. 156 Herald allocated the re-
maining $26 million to going-concern value and goodwill.'5 7
The Treasury regulations in effect at the time allowed a taxpayer
to depreciate an intangible asset as long as the taxpayer could demon-
strate that the asset had a limited useful life and could estimate the
length of that useful life with reasonable accuracy.' 58 These regula-
tions also provided, however, that "[n]o deduction for depreciation is
allowable with respect to goodwill."' 159 Neither the Code nor the reg-
ulations defined "goodwill."' 6
On its tax returns for 1977 to 1980, Herald claimed depreciation
deductions based on the $68 million of the acquisition price allocated
to "paid subscribers.' 161 The Service disallowed these deductions. In
litigation, the government did not try to establish a rational founda-
tion for determining whether a capital asset is depreciable. 62 It
merely declared, without any analysis, that goodwill is nondepreciable
148. See id. at 548.
149. See id at 549.
150. See id at 549 & n.2, 550.
151. See id. at 549.
152. See id
153. See id at 549-50.




158. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3.
159. Id.
160. See Newark Morning Ledger, 507 U.S. at 555.
161. See id. at 550.
162. See id. at 551.
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because the regulations say so, and that any asset resembling conven-
tional goodwill is therefore nondepreciable. 163
Justice Blackmun surveyed the case law and concluded that a use-
ful definition of "goodwill" is "the expectancy of continued pa-
tronage.' 1 64 The value of the "paid subscribers" asset was clearly
based on the expectancy that these subscribers would continue to give
their patronage to Herald. Thus, this asset seemed to fit under the
conventional definition of "goodwill."' 65 Justice Blackmun noted,
however, that whether an asset is depreciable should not be settled by
definition. 66 Instead, Justice Blackmun looked at the purpose of ac-
curately calculating net income.167 Depreciation is necessary to calcu-
late net income accurately when an asset declines in value over its
useful life.' 68 "Goodwill" is treated as a nondepreciable asset only
because it does not decline in value over a limited useful life.1 69 Thus,
for depreciation purposes, "goodwill" ought to be defined in terms of
this key characteristic, rather than by reference to some general defi-
nition unrelated to taxation. Therefore, Justice Blackmun held that "a
taxpayer able to prove that a particular asset can be valued and that it
has a limited useful life may depreciate its value over its useful life
regardless of how much the asset appears to reflect the expectancy of
continued patronage."' 7 °
In his dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White and Scalia, took Justice Blackmun to task for rely-
ing on the "purposes of the Code" in reaching his decision. 7' The
dissenters stated that "[s]uch policy initiatives are properly left to
Congress, which can modify the per se ban on depreciating goodwill at
any time."' 72 Indeed, Congress did substantially modify the law gov-
erning the depreciation of goodwill in 1993, the same year that New-
163. See id. at 551-52.
164. Id. at 555 (quoting Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962)).
165. See id. at 556.
166. See id. at 565 n.13.
167. See id. at 565. Justice Blackmun noted that "[i]t is more faithful to the purposes of
the Code to allow the depreciation deduction under these circumstances, for 'the Code
endeavors to match expenses with the revenues of the taxable period to which they are
properly attributable, thereby resulting in a more accurate calculation of net income for tax
purposes."' Id. (quoting INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992)).
168. See id. at 553.
169. See id. at 564-65.
170. Id. at 566.
171. Id. at 582 n.10 (Souter, J., dissenting).
172. Id.
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ark Morning Ledger was decided, by enacting section 197 of the
Code.173
Section 197 allows taxpayers to amortize most purchased intangi-
ble assets on a straight-line basis over a 15-year period.174 Such sec-
tion 197 intangibles include goodwill, patents, copyrights, know-how,
customer-based or supplier-based intangibles, government licenses,
covenants not to compete, franchises, trademarks, and tradenames. 75
This law brings about a major simplification. It obviates the need for
taxpayers to distinguish goodwill from other section 197 intangibles
because they are all amortizable in the same way. It also obviates the
need for taxpayers to estimate the useful life of section 197 intangibles
because all such intangibles are amortizable over a 15-year period, re-
gardless of their actual useful lives. The Court, of course, would be
institutionally incapable of accomplishing such a sweeping reform.
These capital expenditure cases raise several over-arching issues
that transcend the specific issues in the cases. The first is whether a
Justice should rely on his or her understanding of "tax logic," derived
from an economic concept of income, in interpreting specific provi-
sions of the Code. I will defer discussion of this issue until Part HI.B,
below, when I consider the Tufts case. A second over-arching issue is
how a Justice's view of the comparative institutional competence of
the Court should affect his or her approach to tax cases.
Congress and the Treasury Department have several obvious ad-
vantages over the Court when it comes to developing substantive tax
law. First, Congress and the Treasury have much greater technical ex-
pertise than the Court. Their staffs include experts in tax law as well
as tax economists, who are able to estimate the likely effects of
changes in the tax law on taxpayer behavior and on government reve-
nues. Second, the legislative and regulatory processes allow an oppor-
tunity for thorough public debate of the issues. In litigation in the
Court, in contrast, debate is largely confined to the parties, although
non-parties may file amicus briefs. Finally, Congress and the Treasury
have considerable control over their agendas and enormous flexibility
to fashion new legal rules that balance conflicting interests and policy
concerns. The Court, in contrast, must confine itself to interpreting
the language of the specific Code provisions at issue in the cases that
come before it.
173. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 § 13261(a), Pub. L. No. 103-66
(codified at I.R.C. § 197).
174. See I.R.C. § 197(a).
175. See I.R.C. § 197(d).
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These considerations led Justice Douglas to adopt the view that
the Court in general should avoid hearing substantive tax cases, leav-
ing ambiguities in the Code and loopholes to be fixed by Congress or
the Treasury Department. Justice Douglas was the sole dissenter from
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Commissioner v. Idaho
Power Co.,' 76 where he stated:
This Court has, to many, seemed particularly ill-equipped to re-
solve income tax disputes between the Commissioner and the
taxpayers. The reasons are (1) that the field has become in-
creasingly technical and complicated due to the expansions of
the Code and the proliferation of decisions, and (2) that we sel-
dom see enough of them to develop any expertise in the area.
Indeed, we are called upon mostly to resolve conflicts between
the circuits which more providently should go to the standing
committee of the Congress for resolution. 77
Justice Douglas expressed similar views in his lone dissent from
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in United States v.
Generes:178
I protest now what I have repeatedly protested, and that is the
use of this Court to iron out ambiguities in the Regulations or in the
Act, when the responsible remedy is either a recasting of the Regula-
tions by Treasury or presentation of the problem to the Joint Commit-
tee on Internal Revenue Taxation, which is a standing committee of
the Congress that regularly rewrites the Act and is much abler than
we to forecast the revenue needs and spot loopholes where abuses
thrive.17
9
In a provocative article, Professor Frederick Schauer has argued
that the Justices' lack of expertise and interest in most statutory cases
explains why they increasingly rely on a "plain meaning" approach to
statutory interpretation. 180 According to Professor Schauer, this ap-
proach enables them to conserve judicial resources for more glamour-
ous cases18 ' and facilitates coordination on a single interpretation. 182
Professor Schauer suggests that the "blunt, frequently crude, and cer-
176. 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
177. Id. at 19 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas went on to refer to Idaho Power
as a "picayune case" and to the Court's tax jurisprudence as a "leaden-footed pursuit of
law and justice." Id.
178. 405 U.S. 93 (1972).
179. Id. at 114-15 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
180. See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of
Plain Meaning, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 231, 253-56.
181. See id. at 255 (noting that a plain meaning approach enables the Court to "mar-
shal[ ] its human resources in such a way that it is undesirable for the Justices and their
clerks to become truly internally expert in every subject that comes to their attention").
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tainly narrowing device"'8 3 of plain meaning actually might produce
better results in technical statutory interpretation cases than reliance
on theoretically richer and more sensitive tools of interpretation.8 4
Turning specifically to the tax area, he states that "[m]y instinct is that
these Justices with these clerks with this amount of time will make less
of a hash of tax law in the long run by trying to rely on plain meaning
than by trying to divine and apply the deepest purposes and equities
of the Internal Revenue Code.'
8 5
I find these arguments unpersuasive. I believe Justice Blackmun
is correct that tax law is not something separate and apart from the
rest of the law. Any argument that the Justices should avoid deciding
tax cases or that they should decide these cases using suboptimal
methods of statutory interpretation would apply equally to many
other areas of statutory law. These statutory cases are often very im-
portant to the public welfare' 86 -far too important for the Justices to
ignore them or to decide them haphazardly in the hope that Congress
will bail them out when they make mistakes.
Obviously, none of the Justices-not even one with Justice Black-
mun's impressive background in taxation-can match the expertise of
someone who devotes his or her full time to tax issues. But this lack
of expertise is not peculiar to the tax area. As with all cases involving
technical issues, the parties have a responsibility to educate the Jus-
tices. Indeed, this is often regarded as an advantage of courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction. Requiring specialists to explain technical issues to a
generalist judge can clarify those issues. Moreover, a generalist judge
is more likely than a specialist to rethink issues from first principles
and to see basic arguments that the specialists might have missed be-
cause of their narrower focus. 8 7
182. See id. Professor Schauer argues that the Justices might seek agreement on results
and on methods of inquiry in some significant number of cases for reasons of institutional
stability. See id.
183. Id. at 252.
184. See id. at 254 n.85.
185. Id.
186. Professor Schauer himself notes that many dull statutory interpretation cases are
more socially important than cases involving, say, flag desecration. See id. at 247.
187. As Justice Scalia has noted, "even in a matter as specialized as tax, the disadvan-
tage of inexperience is often more than made up for by the advantage of a fresh outlook
and broad viewpoint." Remarks by Justice Antonin Scalia Before the Fellows of the
American Bar Foundation and the National Conference of Bar Presidents 9-10 (Feb. 15,
1987), quoted in Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking
System, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1111, 1120 (1990).
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In tax cases, because of the amount of money at stake, the private
party is often represented by very able counsel. The Government, of
course, is represented by the Solicitor General's office. This office
usually includes a tax expert. Moreover, it has the support of the Tax
Division staff of the Justice Department. Therefore, the quality of the
briefing and oral argument will tend to be extremely high in tax
cases-much more so than in many other areas of Supreme Court
practice. Moreover, the great majority of the tax cases that the
Supreme Court hears come to the Court because of a split in the
Courts of Appeals. This means that the issues likely will have been
analyzed in several trial court and Court of Appeals decisions, giving
the Justices an excellent starting point for their own analyses.
It is true that a thorough and sensitive analysis of tax cases will
require an expenditure of judicial resources that might be spent on
other cases. The solution, however, is for the Court to exercise care in
selecting cases for argument in the first place. Once the Justices agree
to grant certiorari in a case, there is little justification for taking a sec-
ond-best approach to deciding the case. Moreover, although the
Court could conserve its own resources by treating tax cases superfi-
cially and relying on Congress for correction, this approach would
necessarily waste legislative resources. 188
It is also true that there is a reasonable likelihood of legislative
correction if the Court decides a tax case incorrectly, since legislative
activity occurs frequently in the tax area.189 Newark Morning Ledger
suggests that even when the Court is correct in its holding, Congress is
sometimes quick to step in and enact even more comprehensive re-
forms. On the other hand, the Court's decisions can have a significant
effect on the likelihood of legislative reform. The Court's decisions
always affect the legislative process simply by altering the status quo.
The side that wins in Court has the relatively easy task of blocking
legislative action in order to preserve the status quo. The side that
loses has the much more difficult task of overcoming legislative inertia
to obtain affirmative relief.'90
In the tax context, the Court's decisions further affect the likeli-
hood of legislative reform in a more specific way. If the Supreme
Court decides a case in favor of the Government, it will be difficult for
188. See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 20-32, 38 (1994).
189. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Text, Purpose, Capacity, and Albertson's: A Response to
Professor Geier, 2 FLA. TAX REv. 717, 728 (1996) (arguing that the Code is very amenable
to legislative correction).
190. See id.
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the interest group that loses to obtain legislative relief, because such
relief will result in a revenue loss. Under the current budgetary pro-
cess, this revenue loss must be offset with a revenue-raising provision.
The inclusion of such a provision in the legislative package will gener-
ate opposition from the interest groups whose taxes will increase as a
result of the revenue-raising provision. In consequence, the losing in-
terest group will likely find it very difficult to prevail in Congress.' 9'
For example, in Newark Morning Ledger, if the Court had decided
that case in favor of the Government, the bill that enacted section 197
probably would have become a revenue loser. The need to include a
revenue raising provision would then have made passage of the bill
much less likely, possibly resulting in a loss of the opportunity to make
this very significant tax reform.
Finally, even if Congress can be expected to respond by cor-
recting mistakes, it is still simplistic to argue that the Court need not
be concerned with fixing loopholes or with deciding tax cases cor-
rectly. There inevitably will be delays before Congress enacts correc-
tive legislation, and aggressive taxpayers will be able to exploit
loopholes or erroneous Supreme Court interpretations of the law in
the interim. Because taxpayers can often move huge sums of money
very rapidly to exploit such opportunities, these interim consequences
can be very substantial. Moreover, the congressional correction al-
most invariably will increase the already staggering complexity of the
Code.192 Finally, even after Congress enacts corrective legislation,
there is a good chance that taxpayers and their legal advisors will suc-
ceed in designing even more sophisticated transactions to get around
the new legislation as well. It is unrealistic to expect Congress to draft
unambiguous and loophole-free statutes, or even corrections to stat-
utes. The limits of the English language ensure ambiguity, and the
limits of human foresight ensure unintended loopholes. The courts
can serve a critical role as a back-stop against abusive transactions
that exploit these ambiguities and loopholes. To do so, however, they
must interpret the Code in light of its basic underlying purposes - in
191. See Deborah A. Geier, Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role of Purpose, 2 FLA.
TAX REv. 492, 511 n.62 (1995) (noting that the response that Congress can always fix a
wrong tax decision is far too facile today because under budget laws enacted in the 1980s,
statutory proposals that would lose revenue must be matched by proposals that would raise
revenue).
192. One can argue, however, about whether overlaying the Code with a judicial gloss
might result in an even more complicated system than would result from legislative
correction.
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particular, the purpose of accurately measuring economic income. 193
Not only will this approach remove the unwarranted benefits of abu-
sive transactions after the fact, but it will also deter taxpayers from
engaging in such transactions in the first place.
B. The Role of Tax Logic in Statutory Interpretation: Commissioner
V. Tufts
Commissioner v. Tufts 9 4 deals with the effect of a nonrecourse
loan on the amount realized when property is sold. 9 5 Nonrecourse
debt is debt for which the borrower is not personally liable.' 96 The
lender's only remedy in the case of default is to foreclose on the prop-
erty that secures the debt. If the fair market value of that property
falls below the amount of the outstanding debt, the debtor can simply
abandon the property to the lender, who will bear the loss.
When Justice Blackmun decided Tufts, he was writing against the
background of Crane v. Commissioner.97 In 1932, Beulah B. Crane
inherited an apartment building and lot from her deceased hus-
band.198 At the time of her husband's death, the property had an ap-
praised fair market value of $255,000.199 It was also subject to a
nonrecourse mortgage in the same amount. °0 Between 1932 and
1938, Crane managed the apartment building and claimed deprecia-
tion deductions totaling $25,000.2°1 She based these deductions on the
193. I have focused above on the possibility that Congress will correct its own mistakes
or erroneous Court decisions. Another possibility, raised by Justice Douglas in the quota-
tions above, is that the Treasury Department might make these corrections through regula-
tions. Of course, there are limits to the Treasury's authority to do so. Another problem
with relying on regulatory agencies for correction is that they are often prone to capture by
the interest groups they are supposed to regulate. Therefore, they cannot be relied on to
act as faithful agents of Congress. Some tax scholars have argued that the Treasury De-
partment is less prone to capture than most administrative agencies. See Edward A. Zelin-
sky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of Tax
Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.L 1165, 1192-94 (1993); Daniel Shaviro,
Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated
by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 114-15 (1990). Even if this assertion
is true, there is still the risk that the Treasury will overreach because of its mission of
protecting the Government's revenues.
194. 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
195. See id. at 302.
196. See id.
197. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). In order to make the underlying logic of Crane more transpar-
ent, the discussion in the text is based on a slightly simplified version of the facts, including
alterations of the dollar amounts involved.
198. See id. at 3.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 3 & n.2.
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premise that her basis in the property at the time of inheritance was
$255,000.202 In 1938, Crane sold the property, still subject to the
$255,000 mortgage, to a third party for $2,500 in cash.2 °3
The applicable provisions of the tax law at the time of the events
in Crane were essentially the same as the corresponding provisions of
current law. (To facilitate the discussion of both Crane and Tufts, I
will refer consistently to the current provisions.) Section 1001(a) of
the Code provides that "[t]he gain from the sale or other disposition
of property shall be the excess of the amount realized therefrom over
the adjusted basis . . . ." Section 1001(b) defines the "amount real-
ized" as "the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of
the property (other than money) received." The Code further pro-
vides that the initial basis of property acquired from a decedent shall
be the fair market value of the property at the date of the decedent's
death,2 4 and that this basis shall be adjusted (i.e., reduced) over time
by the amount of any allowable depreciation deductions.20 5
The issue in Crane was how much gain Crane realized on her sale
of property in 1938.206 On her tax return, Crane reported a gain of
$2,500 on the transaction.20 7 According to her analysis, the "prop-
erty" in question was her equity in the apartment building and lot.20 8
When she acquired the property by inheritance in 1938, the value of
this property was zero because the fair market value of the apartment
building and lot was exactly offset by the amount of the mortgage.20 9
Her initial basis in the property was zero.210 Given a zero basis, she
was not entitled to claim depreciation deductions.21' Therefore, her
adjusted basis in the property in 1938 was still zero.212 When she sold
the property in 1938, her amount realized was equal to the $2,500 in
cash that she received.213 Thus, her gain from the sale was equal to
$2,500 (her amount realized) minus zero (her adjusted basis in the
property), or $2,500.214
202. See id. at 3.
203. See id.
204. See I.R.C. §§ 1011(a), 1014(a)(1).
205. See I.R.C. § 1016(a).
206. See Crane, 331 U.S. at 2-3.




211. See id. Of course, this is contrary to what she actually did in prior years, when she
claimed depreciation deductions totaling $25,000. See id at 3 & n.2.
212. See id at 3.
213. See id at 3-4.
214. See id. at 4.
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The Commissioner disagreed with this analysis and determined
that Crane realized a gain of $27,500 on the transaction.2 1 5 He theo-
rized that the "property" she acquired and sold was not her equity in
the apartment building and lot, but rather the physical property itself;
that is, her rights to possess, use, and dispose of the property, undi-
minished by the mortgage.21 6 Her initial basis in this property was
equal to its fair market value at the date of the decedent's death, or
$255,000.217 Her adjusted basis in the property at the time of sale was
equal to her initial basis minus the $25,000 of allowable depreciation,
or $230,000.218 Her amount realized on the sale included not only the
$2,500 in cash, but also the $255,000 of debt to which the property was
subject, for a total amount realized of $257,500.219 Thus, her gain
from the sale was equal to $257,500 (amount realized) minus $230,000
(adjusted basis in the property), or $27,500.
The Court in Crane agreed with the Commissioner that the term
"property" meant the building and lot, undiminished by the mort-
gage.220 Thus, Crane's original basis was $255,000.221 In addition, the
Court agreed that the $255,000 of debt to which the property was sub-
ject was properly included in the "amount realized" on the sale.222
The Court began by noting that if Crane had been personally liable on
the mortgage, relief from the mortgage would have produced an eco-
nomic benefit to Crane equal to $255,000.3 The benefit would have
been the same as if Crane had been paid $255,000 in cash and had
used the cash to repay the mortgage.224 Therefore, relief from a per-
sonal debt should be treated as if it were "money received" for pur-
poses of the definition of "amount realized."2'
The Court then argued that even though Crane was not person-
ally liable on the debt, relief from the mortgage still produced an eco-
nomic benefit to her valued at $255,000.226 The Court reasoned that if
the lender had called the loan in 1938, Crane would have wanted to






220. See id. at 5.
221. See id. at 4-5.
222. See id. at 14.
223. See id. at 13.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 14.
226. See id.
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erty, because the property was worth $2,500 more than the mort-
gage.227 In other words, she would have treated the loan exactly as if
it were a loan for which she were personally liable. Thus, according to
the Court, when Crane sold the property subject to the mortgage, "the
benefit to [her was] as real and substantial as if the mortgage were
discharged, or as if a personal debt in an equal amount had been as-
sumed by another."'  In footnote 37, however, the Court added the
following qualification:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount of
the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot
realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a differ-
ent problem might be encountered where a mortgagor aban-
doned the property or transferred it subject to the mortgage
without receiving boot. That is not this case.22 9
Although Crane lost the case, her analysis was economically
sound. Before she inherited the apartment building and lot, her net
worth was zero. After she inherited the property, her net worth was
still zero, because the value of the property was exactly offset by the
amount of the mortgage. After she sold the property, her net worth
was $2,500, because she owned $2,500 in cash and had no other assets
or liabilities. Therefore, under the Haig-Simons definition of income,
she realized income of $2,500 during the period involved in the case.
This is exactly the amount of income that results from Crane's
analysis.PO
The Commissioner's analysis, however, also produces the correct
result, if one ignores differences in timing and any difference between
capital gains and ordinary income.231 Under the Commissioner's anal-
ysis, Crane had an initial basis of $255,000 in the property, and there-
227. See id at 12.
228. See id at 14 (footnote omitted). Professor Boris Bittker has argued that this final
step in the Court's reasoning is incorrect. In Professor Bittker's view, a taxpayer receives
an economic benefit when she is relieved of a nonrecourse mortgage and retains the prop-
erty without the mortgage, but not when she is relieved of a nonrecourse mortgage because
she disposes of the mortgaged property. See Boris Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt,
and the Crane Case, 33 TAX L. Rnv. 277, 282 (1978).
229. Crane, 331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
230. Of course, under Crane's analysis, she was not entitled to the depreciation deduc-
tions that she claimed from 1932 to 1938. If she were allowed to claim those deductions
and still to report only $2,500 of gain-which is what she actually did on her tax returns -
then the result would be incorrect. The Service was in a bind in the Crane case, because
the statute of limitations undoubtedly had run on most of Crane's claimed depreciation
deductions. Thus, to achieve the economically correct result in her case, the Service had no
choice but to challenge the amount realized on the sale.
231. Of course, differences in timing and differences between capital gains and ordinary
income should not be ignored. They are very important.
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fore was entitled to claim $25,000 of depreciation deductions while she
held the property.23 2 When she sold the property, she realized gain of
$27,500.211 When the $25,000 of depreciation deductions are netted
against this gain, the result is $2,500 of income-exactly the amount
prescribed by the Haig-Simons definition.
It was against this backdrop that Justice Blackmun decided the
Commissioner v. Tuft 4 case. Tufts raised precisely the question left
open in footnote 37 in Crane. In 1970, a partnership constructed an
apartment complex using $1.9 million in funds that it had borrowed on
a nonrecourse basis.235 Over the next two years, the partnership
claimed depreciation deductions on the property totaling $400,000. 236
Therefore, at the end of this period, the partnership had an adjusted
basis in the property equal to $1.5 million.37 The property, however,
had declined in fair market value to $1.4 million.3 8 Then, the partner-
ship sold the property, subject to the nonrecourse debt, for a de
minimis amount of cash.23 9
The partnership reported a loss of $100,000 from the sale.240 The
partnership claimed that the amount realized on the sale was equal to
the fair market value of the property, or $1.4 million.241 The gain was
then equal to this amount minus the partnership's $1.5 million ad-
justed basis in the property, a loss of $100,000.242 On audit, the Com-
missioner determined that the sale resulted in a gain of $400,000.243
The Commissioner's theory was that the amount realized on the sale
was equal to the full amount of the nonrecourse obligation, or $1.9
million.24 The gain was then equal to this amount minus the partner-
ship's $1.5 million adjusted basis in the property, or $400,000.245
232. See Crane, 331 U.S. at 4.
233. See id. at 4-5.
234. 461 U.S. 300 (1982).
235. See id. at 302. In order to make the underlying logic of Tufts more transparent, the
discussion in the text is based on a slightly simplified version of the facts. For example, the
partnership actually invested $44,212 of its own capital in the apartment complex as well as
the approximately $1.9 of borrowed funds.
236. See id.
237. See id.
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The taxpayer's theory in Tufts is inconsistent with the Haig-
Simons definition of income. Before the events in Tufts, the partner-
ship had no assets and no liabilities, and therefore had a net worth of
zero.24 6 It then borrowed money on a nonrecourse basis, built the
apartment complex, and later sold the complex subject to the debt for
a de minimis amount of cash, ending up with no assets and no liabili-
ties, a net worth of zero.2 47 Therefore, under the Haig-Simons defini-
tion of income, it realized no gain or loss during this period. For tax
purposes, however, it reported a total tax loss of $500,000, consisting
of the $400,000 of depreciation deductions and an additional loss of
$100,000 on the sale.2 48 Under the Commissioner's theory, in con-
trast, the partnership would have a total tax loss of zero-the $400,000
of depreciation deductions would be exactly offset by the gain of
$400,000 realized on the sale.2 49
One can also understand the correctness of the Commissioner's
approach by considering how the partnership in Tufts treated the $1.9
million nonrecourse mortgage in 1970. The $1.9 million was not in-
cluded in income, but was included in the partnership's basis in the
property, on the assumption that the partnership would repay the $1.9
million. s When the partnership sold the property subject to the
mortgage in 1972, however, it became clear that the partnership would
never repay the $1.9 million.25' In order to correct the mistaken initial
assumption, the partnership should be required to include the $1.9
million amount of the loan in the amount realized on the sale of the
property. This was exactly Justice Blackmun's analysis in Tufts' 2
The problem is that it is impossible to reconcile this result with
the language of the Code." 3 Section 1001(b) defines "amount real-
ized" as "the sum of any money received plus the fair market value of
the property (other than money) received." This language can be con-
strued broadly to include the value of any economic benefit received
246. See id at 302.
247. See id. at 302-03.
248. See id. at 302.
249. As noted above, the result under the Commission's theory is not exactly the same
as the result under the Haig-Simons definition because of differences in timing and differ-
ences between capital gains and ordinary income. See supra note 231 and accompanying
text.
250. See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 302.
251. See id at 303.
252. See id at 307-08.
253. See Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, "Purposivism," and the Interpretation of
Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REv. 675, 693-94 (1966); Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Non-
literal Interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C. L. RFv. 623, 653 (1986).
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by the seller. Certainly, as the Court noted in Crane, when a pur-
chaser assumes a personal liability of the seller, it is the same as if the
purchaser paid the seller additional money, which the seller used to
repay the liability. Thus, relief from a personal liability is like "money
received," a component of the definition of "amount realized."
When a purchaser takes property subject to a nonrecourse mort-
gage in excess of the value of the property, this clearly does not confer
an economic benefit on the seller equal to the full amount of the mort-
gage. The seller's liability on the nonrecourse mortgage is limited to
the value of the property securing the mortgage. Therefore, the
seller's economic benefit from being relieved of a nonrecourse mort-
gage cannot exceed the value of the property. Relief from a nonre-
course mortgage can be considered to constitute either "money
received" or "property (other than money) received" only to the ex-
tent of this economic benefit." 54
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Tufts upheld the
Commissioner's position."5 Justice Blackmun based his decision in
part on tax logic, noting that "[t]o permit the taxpayer to limit his
realization to the fair market value of the property would be to recog-
nize a tax loss for which he has suffered no corresponding economic
loss.""z 6 But Justice Blackmun also relied on post-enactment judicial
precedents and administrative practice, particularly the Court's previ-
ous decision in Crane. Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the eco-
nomic benefit theory underlying the decision in Crane does not
support his result, but he interpreted Crane also to stand for the prop-
osition that a nonrecourse loan should always be treated as a personal
loan for purposes of section 1001(b).25 7 The decision in Tufts follows
from this proposition.
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Tufts, together with his opinions in
the capital expenditure cases discussed in Part HLI.A, raise the issue of
how much, if at all, a Justice should rely on statutory purpose-in par-
ticular, on his or her understanding of "tax logic" based on an eco-
nomic concept of income-in interpreting specific provisions of the
Code. In each of the substantive tax opinions discussed above, Justice
Blackmun reached a result that is consistent with the Haig-Simons
definition of income. Moreover, Justice Blackmun explicitly relied on
notions of tax logic in deciding these cases. His decision in Tufts, how-
254. See I.R.C. § 1001(b).
255. See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 313.
256. Id. (footnote omitted).
257. See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947).
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ever, is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the text of the
specific statutory provision at issue.
Yet Justice Blackmun's decision in Tufts seems clearly correct. If
section 1001(b) were truly read literally, not even relief from a per-
sonal debt would qualify as an "amount realized," since such relief is
not literally "money" or "property (other than money)." If one ex-
pands the meaning of "amount realized" to include any economic
benefit received by the taxpayer, this solves the problem of relief from
personal debt, but still produces a result at odds with the economic
concept of income when applied to relief from a nonrecourse mort-
gage where the amount of the mortgage exceeds the value of the
property. It seems clear, however, that Congress did not contemplate
this specific situation when it drafted section 1001(b); indeed, Con-
gress seems not to have contemplated relief from indebtedness at all.
Under these circumstances, it seem reasonable to allow tax logic to
trump statutory language.
But perhaps the distinction between tax logic and statutory text is
actually illusory. In particular, perhaps one can deduce the principles
of tax logic from the text of the Code, read in its entirety. If so, even a
textualist might find an interpretation based on tax logic acceptable-
the interpretation would be what an informed, intelligent reader
would understand the words of the Code provision at issue to mean
when the provision is read in the context of the Code as a whole.
Unfortunately, I do not believe that tax logic can be deduced
from the Code in this manner. Tax scholars often use the Haig-
Simons definition of income as the touchstone for tax logic, as I have
done in my discussion of Justice Blackmun's substantive tax opinions.
But Henry Simons did not come up with his definition by reading the
Internal Revenue Code and inferring what Congress meant to tax.
Quite the contrary. The source of his definition is economics, and tax
scholars use his definition as an external yardstick against which the
provisions of the Code can be evaluated and criticized." 8
Quite simply, it ffies in the face of reality to suppose that one can
deduce the Haig-Simons definition of income from the language of
the Code, or to assume that Congress intended for all Code provisions
to conform to this definition. 9 On the contrary, Congress often has
258. See MICHAEL J. GRAETz & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION:
PINCIPLES AND PoLICIEs 107 (3d ed. 1995). Professors Graetz and Schenk note that the
Haig-Simons definition of income "is used by many economists and lawyers as a basis for
testing the equity of the income tax." Id.
259. See id. Professors Graetz and Schenk state that:
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departed from the Haig-Simons concept of income, and it has done so
for a host of reasons.
First, as discussed in connection with Justice Blackmun's capital
expenditure cases, a rigorous implementation of the Haig-Simons def-
inition would be impracticable. In particular, it is not practical to re-
quire taxpayers to calculate the change in their net worth during the
taxable period, as the Haig-Simons definition would require, because
this would require them to determine the fair market value of all of
their assets at the end of each year.261 If it were simple and costless to
do this, then all expenditures that produce benefits beyond the taxable
year would be treated as capital expenditures, and all capital assets
would be treated as depreciable, with the allowable depreciation be-
ing equal to the change in the value of the assets each year. It is pre-
cisely because it is impractical to determine fair market value that the
tax law requires taxpayers, the Service, and the courts to draw lines
between ordinary expenses and capital expenditures, and between de-
preciable and non-depreciable capital assets.
Viewed in this light, each of the capital expenditure cases dis-
cussed above involved finding a compromise between the conflicting
goals of accurately reflecting economic income and achieving a practi-
cal and administrable tax system. I think Justice Blackmun ap-
proached these cases correctly. On the one hand, he followed a Haig-
Simons approach in laying down general principles, in particular, the
concept that "capital expenditure" should be construed broadly and
that capital assets should generally be treated as depreciable if they
have a limited useful life that can be estimated with reasonable accu-
racy. On the other hand, however, he declined to establish bright-line
rules for drawing these lines and insisted instead that each case must
be decided on the basis of its specific facts.
A second problem in relying on the Haig-Simons definition is
that it is ambiguous. In particular, the concept of "consumption" is
not well defined. As a result, translating the Haig-Simons definition
into specific tax rules often requires one to make further, contestable
Simons himself... noted that the definition would not serve for all purposes and,
without modification, would not describe a satisfactory tax base. It is also not
clear that a generally accepted economic definition of income necessarily should
be accepted by Congress, the Service and the Courts for tax purposes.
Id.
260. It is also impracticable to have taxpayers rigorously calculate the market value of
their consumption during the year. This would require, for example, that they determine
and pay tax on the fair market rental value of the homes they own and occupy, on the fair
market rental value of the consumer durables they own and use, and on the fair market
value of the services they provide for themselves.
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policy choices. A classic example is the issue whether deductions for
charitable contributions and medical expenses are consistent with the
Haig-Simons definition of income. This, in turn, hinges on whether
one regards making a charitable contribution or using medical services
as a form of personal consumption. Leading tax scholars have
reached opposite conclusions on this basic issue.26' Clearly, a Justice
cannot decide such issues through an abstract inquiry into the eco-
nomic meaning of income.
Third, the Code is full of "tax incentive" or "tax expenditure"
provisions. These are provisions in which Congress has intentionally
departed from an economic concept of income in order to advance a
legislative purpose other than the accurate measurement of economic
income.2 62 For example, the Code's treatment of saving departs radi-
cally from the Haig-Simons definition with respect to two of the most
important forms of personal saving, owner-occupied housing and re-
tirement saving. These departures are intentional. Congress wanted
to give taxpayers a greater incentive to own their own homes and to
save for their retirement than they would have under a pure Haig-
Simons income tax.
Finally, members of Congress sometimes depart from an eco-
nomic concept of income, not because they are trying to advance
some public policy, but because they wish to do favors for interest
groups in exchange for campaign contributions, votes, or other bene-
fits. As a result of all these factors, there are substantial and pervasive
differences between the meaning of "income" in the Code and the
Haig-Simons definition of income. These differences are so great that
many tax scholars have concluded that our so-called income tax is not
really an income tax at all.263
261. Compare William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
-IARv. L. REv. 309 (1972) (deductions for charitable contributions and medical expenses
are consistent with the Haig-Simons definition), with Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deduc-
tions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a
Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. Rnv. 831, 834 (1979) (deductions for charitable contri-
butions and medical expenses are not consistent with the Haig-Simons definition).
262. Of course, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, because the Haig-Simons defi-
nition is ambiguous, it is often impossible to distinguish between "tax expenditure" provi-
sions and provisions that accurately measure income.
263. See generally UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID TNcomE-CoNsuMP-
TION TAX (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988). In the introduction to this book, the editors
note:
Analysts have recognized that despite their names, neither the "personal income
tax" nor the "corporation income tax" is a true income tax. For a variety of rea-
sons, practical and political, Congress has repeatedly shied away from any at-
tempt to tax such major elements of income as accrued but unrealized capital
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Thus, there are serious problems with relying on legislative pur-
pose in interpreting Code provisions, and in particular with relying on
the presumed purpose of accurately reflecting economic income. The
alternative of ignoring purpose and considering only text is attractive
on a number of grounds.264 Arguably, textualism best reflects the
constitutional roles of Congress and the Court. According to this ar-
gument, the constitutional role of Congress is to enact texts; the law
consists of these texts, not the unexpressed intent or purpose of Con-
gress.265 The constitutional role of the Court, in this view, is to follow
the enacted text, not to produce what the Justices consider to be the
most desirable result.2 66 Textualism also promotes formal, rule-of-law
values; in particular, it enables citizens to rely on clear statutory lan-
guage to determine their rights and duties.2 67 Finally, according to
this argument, textualism confines judicial discretion.268
One problem with this argument is that a textual approach to
statutory interpretation is not nearly as neutral and deterministic as
proponents of texualism would like. Text-based sources of interpreta-
tion are themselves manipulable. The dictionary will often give a
range of meanings for the words of a statute, from which a Justice may
choose. In some cases, the dictionary is not helpful at all. For exam-
ple, in the capital expenditures cases discussed above, the Code uses
the term "ordinary"-not in its everyday meaning, but as a term of art
gains.... And certain elements of the personal income tax-notably the treat-
ment of qualified pensions, individual retirement accounts, Keogh plans, and
other tax-sheltered saving-resemble the rules that would apply under a con-
sumption tax. In addition, Congress on its own initiative and with the consent of
successive administrations has enacted a host of special-purpose credits, deduc-
tions, and allowances for reasons that had no basis in the principles of either
income or consumption taxation.
Id. at 1.
264. Justice Blackmun did decide one federal tax case using what appears to be a plain
meaning approach. In Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386 (1984), he interpreted a
statute of limitations provision on the basis of its "plain and unambiguous language." Id.
at 396. He went further and appeared explicitly to reject reliance on policy considerations:
"The relevant question is not whether, as an abstract matter, the rule advocated by peti-
tioners accords with good poicy.... Courts are not authorized to rewrite a statute because
they might deem its effects susceptible of improvement." Id. at 398. In spite of this state-
ment, Justice Blackmun did go on to discuss the policies supporting his interpretation, see
id. at 398-400, and he concluded that "substantial policy considerations support [the provi-
sion's] literal language." Id. at 398. For a criticism of this opinion, see Douglas A. Kahn,
The Supreme Court's Misconstruction of a Procedural Statute - A Critique of the Court's
Decision in Badaracco, 82 MicH. L. REv. 461 (1983).
265. See Scalia, supra 95, at 17-18.
266. See id. at 22.
267. See id. at 25.
268. See id. at 17-18.
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to state the distinction between deductible expenses and capital ex-
penditures. The dictionary definition of "ordinary" sheds no light on
the nature of this distinction.
The textual approach becomes even less deterministic when one
considers context. The meaning of a text is strongly influenced by
context, and this includes the interpreter's own context. It is a com-
monplace observation that individuals with differing viewpoints will
often understand the same words differently.269
Textualism also ignores values that are promoted by considering
purpose, particularly the value of allowing statutes to develop over
time to meet new circumstances. This value is especially important in
the tax area. As discussed above, it is unrealistic to expect Congress
to anticipate all of the clever transactions that taxpayers and their ad-
visors will devise to exploit ambiguities and loopholes in the Code. If
the Court is to serve as a back-stop to protect against abusive transac-
tions, the Justices must engage in purposive interpretation.
Of course, this is no easy task. The Justices must distinguish true
loopholes from intentional departures from an economic concept of
income. And they must be able to analyze complex transactions to
determine their economic substance.27 Finally, they must balance the
benefits of purposive interpretation against the costs, including in-
creased uncertainty and the possible "chilling" of legitimate
transactions.
Justice Blackmun's practical reasoning approach would seem to
be the best course in light of these considerations. Although Justice
Blackmun did consider purpose-in particular, the purpose of reflect-
ing economic income-in deciding substantive tax cases, he did not
rely on this consideration exclusively. He also considered the statu-
tory text; other policies, such as treating similarly situated taxpayers
alike; the practical implications of alternative holdings; and post-en-
269. More generally, individuals tend to display a "confirmatory bias" when they evalu-
ate evidence. That is, they tend to ignore evidence that contradicts their existing viewpoint
or even to misinterpret such evidence as additional support for their viewpoint. For a
discussion of the literature on this psychological phenomenon, see Matthew Rabin, Psy-
chology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. Lrr. 11, 26-29 (1998).
270. Arguably, even Justice Blackmun was not always successful at this. For example,
in Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), Justice Blackmun concluded that
the economic substance of a complicated three-party sale and leaseback transaction was
consistent with its form, and that the Government was unlikely to lose significant revenue
if this form were respected. See id. at 583-84. For a criticism of this analysis, see Bernard
Wolfnan, The Supreme Court in the Lyon's Den: A Failure of Judicial Process, 66 CORnNELL
L. REv. 1075 (1981).
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actment developments, including judicial precedents and administra-
tive practice.
The practical reasoning approach is difficult to apply well. It re-
quires a Justice to evaluate and balance a wide range of often conflict-
ing factors. This requires judgment. But judgment is the
quintessential quality that we expect of judges. In the hands of a ca-
pable judge, the practical reasoning approach seems almost certain to
produce better decisions than one that singles out one factor, to the
exclusion of all others, as the touchstone for interpretation.
1V. Conclusion
Justice Blackmun's opinions in federal tax cases reflect many of
his strengths as a Justice. In particular, they reflect his practical rea-
soning approach to deciding cases, an approach that is particularly
suited to tax cases. They also reflect his tremendous sense of duty to
the Court, to the parties who appear before it, and to the public it
serves. I have, in this article, focused on a small number of the Jus-
tice's tax opinions that I find particularly important and interesting.
To Justice Blackmun, however, every case was important, interesting,
and worthy of meticulous attention to detail and careful deliberation.
I have discussed whether the Justices might, or should, be influenced
in their approach to substantive tax cases by a view that the Court
lacks institutional competence in the tax area and that Congress can
always correct the Court's mistakes. For Justice Blackmun, however,
these considerations would simply be irrelevant. He saw his duty
clearly. It was to do the best he could to do justice in every case that
came before him.
